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Abstract
Was the increase in income inequality in the US due to permanent shocks or
merely to an increase in the variance of transitory shocks? The implications for
consumption and welfare depend crucially on the answer to this question. We
use CEX repeated cross-section data on consumption and income to decompose
idiosyncratic changes in income into predictable life-cycle changes, transitory and
permanent shocks and estimate the contribution of each to total inequality. Our
model ￿ts the joint evolution of consumption and income inequality well and delivers
two main results. First, we ￿nd that permanent changes in income explain all of the
increase in inequality in the 1980s and 90s. Second, we reconcile this ￿nding with
the fact that consumption inequality did not increase much over this period. Our
results support the view that many permanent changes in income are predictable for
consumers, even if they look unpredictable to the econometrician, consistent with
models of heterogeneous income pro￿les.
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11 Introduction
This paper evaluates the nature of increased income inequality in the US over the 1980-
2000 period. This is important because income inequality originating from di⁄erent
sources may have di⁄erent implications for consumption inequality and welfare. For ex-
ample, under standard models of consumption smoothing, households do not adjust their
consumption much in response to transitory shocks to their income. Hence, increases
in income inequality generated by transitory shocks will have only very small e⁄ects on
consumption inequality and welfare. Similarly, consumption does not respond to per-
manent changes in income that are insured or foreseen in advance. On the other hand,
unexpected and uninsurable permanent income shocks will translate almost one-for-one
into changes in consumption and will, therefore, have strong welfare e⁄ects.
We use repeated cross-section data on income and consumption from the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX) to estimate the extent to which di⁄erent types of income
shocks have contributed to the evolution of inequality. In order to extract this informa-
tion, we need to put some structure on the data. More precisely, we make assumptions
on the form of the stochastic process governing the evolution of individual income and
postulate a model of consumption choice. These assumptions allow us to map cross-
sectional variances of income and consumption within a cohort (inequality) into variances
of permanent and transitory shocks (risk).
In our model, income follows an exogenous stochastic process driven by permanent
and transitory shocks. We assume that consumers can self-insure against transitory
shocks. In addition, we allow for permanent changes in income that do not translate into
changes in consumption. We model these permanent income ￿ shocks￿that do not a⁄ect
consumption as heterogeneity: changes in income over the life-cycle that are predictable
to the consumer. If in reality there are other reasons why changes in consumption do
not re￿ ect permanent changes in income, then we will overestimate the contribution of
heterogeneity to inequality. We discuss this issue, in particular the possibility that there
exist insurance markets that allow for risk sharing between consumers, and argue that
there is a role for heterogeneity over and above risk sharing.
Our study delivers two main results. First, essentially all of the increase in income
inequality over the sample period is due to an increase in the cross-sectional variance
of permanent shocks to income. Second, most of these permanent income shocks were
not of the kind that gets transmitted to consumption. Therefore, our estimates point to
heterogeneity as a major source of the increase in inequality in the 1980s. The variance
of transitory and unpredictable permanent shocks to income also increased in the early
eighties, but the increase was small compared to the total increase in inequality and got
reversed by the end of the nineties.
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. The trends in the data can be
characterized by three salient features: (i) individual income is highly persistent over
the whole sample period, (ii) income inequality rose substantially in the 1990s and,
particularly, in the 1980s but (iii) over the same period consumption inequality did not
increase much. If the evolution of income inequality were driven by transitory shocks,
we should see much lower autocorrelation in individual income processes. If unexpected
2and uninsurable permanent shocks were the driving force, we would expect a rise in
consumption inequality accompanying the increase in income inequality. This leaves
only the third candidate, heterogeneity, able to explain all aspects of the data.
We are not the ￿rst to notice that consumption does not respond to permanent
income shocks as much as standard models would predict. This ￿nding is typically
interpreted as evidence that consumers have access to markets that allow them to share
risks with other consumers, insuring some or all of their idiosyncratic shocks (Krueger
and Perri 2006, Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron 2004b, Primiceri and Van Rens 2004,
Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston 2008, Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante 2006).1 In
this paper we o⁄er an alternative explanation. If there is heterogeneity in life-cycles
across consumers, as Lillard and Weiss (1979) and more recently Guvenen (2005, 2007)
have argued, then consumption may not re￿ ect changes in income, even if they are
permanent, because these changes are predictable to the household in advance.
Partial risk sharing and heterogeneity are observationally equivalent in our model.
Nevertheless, we argue that it is unlikely that risk sharing is the sole mechanism respon-
sible for the muted response of consumption to permanent shocks. First, the degree of
risk sharing necessary to match the data would have to be substantially higher than
what other studies have found (Attanasio and Davis 1996). Second, we test a number
of predictions of the risk sharing hypothesis (some risk sharing happens through gov-
ernment taxes and transfers or through markets for ￿nancial assets) and do not ￿nd
convincing evidence for any of these. Finally, our interpretation that heterogeneity is an
important driver of inequality is consistent with a number of recent papers decomposing
inequality in heterogeneity and uncertainty, using schooling choices (Cunha, Heckman
and Navarro 2005, Cunha and Heckman 2006, Huggett, Ventura and Yaron 2006). The
identifying assumption in these papers as well as in ours is that heterogeneity, even if
unobservable to econometrician, is forecastable to the consumer and therefore a⁄ects
her choices. Then, using an observable outcome of those choices, one can identify het-
erogeneity from risk. The main di⁄erence is that in our case the observable is not
the individual￿ s education level but her consumption choice. The fact that both ￿ in-
struments￿yield similar conclusions about the sources of inequality provides additional
support for our interpretation.
Earlier investigations of the sources of increase in income inequality have followed
either of two alternative approaches. Carroll (1992), Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt (1994) and
Mo¢ tt and Gottschalk (1995 and 2002) use only data on income, thus avoiding having
to model consumer behavior and arguing that the autocovariance structure of income
growth is informative about the relative importance of permanent and transitory shocks.
In particular, Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt (1994) exploit the long panel dimension of the
Michigan Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID). They emphasizes the contribution
1Recently, the basic ￿nding that the increase in the volatility of shocks to income in the 1980s
did not translate into an increase in consumption risk has been questioned. Attanasio, Battistin and
Ichimura (2004) use the CEX diary survey to show that the increase in consumption inequality was more
pronounced for frequently purchased items like food. Gorbachev (2007) uses PSID data and con￿rms
that the volatility of annual changes in individual food consumption increased substantially over this
period.
3of transitory inequality, but nevertheless conclude that approximately two thirds of the
increase in inequality between the 1970-78 and 1979-87 periods was due to permanent
shocks and only one third to transitory shocks. Moreover, Mo¢ tt and Gottschalk (2002)
￿nd that transitory shocks contributed negatively to the overall evolution of income
inequality in the 1990s.
On the other hand, Blundell and Preston (1998) investigate a similar issue using
consumption data and a simple model of consumption behavior. Their identifying
assumption is the permanent income hypothesis in its pure form, which implies that
consumption responds to permanent but not to transitory shocks to income. Since
consumption inequality did not increase (much) over the sample period, Blundell and
Preston conclude that the increase in income inequality must have been mainly due to
transitory shocks.
In this paper, we use the information in both the autocovariance structure of income
and the comovement between consumption and income inequality. As documented by
Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt on the one hand and Blundell and Preston on the other, these
two pieces of information seem to contradict each other.2 In order to reconcile them, we
need to allow for income shocks that are permanent, but are not transmitted to changes
in consumption. Predictable permanent changes in income, capturing heterogeneity in
life-cycle pro￿les, deliver this property.
The paper most closely related to ours is Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008), who
use individual income and consumption data to estimate the extent to which households
are able to insure against income shocks. Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) use
income data from the PSID and adopt an imputation procedure to construct a measure
of total non-durable consumption for households in the PSID, given food expenditure
data and a demand function for food, estimated from the CEX. One advantage of our
approach is that we measure consumption and income for the same household and do not
need to worry about potential weaknesses of the imputation procedure. Consistent with
our estimates, Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) ￿nd that consumption is insulated
from most income shocks, but they interpret this result as evidence for a substantial
degree of risk sharing. We show that heterogeneity can explain the same patterns in the
data as partial risk sharing and argue in favor of the former interpretation.
In this respect our paper is related to the work of Guvenen (2005, 2007), who shows
that heterogeneity in income pro￿les accounts for a large part of the increase in income
inequality for a given cohort with age. The predictable and unpredictable shocks in
Guvenen￿ s work have di⁄erent statistical properties, which allows for their identi￿cation
using income data only. In this paper, identi￿cation relies on the comovement of con-
sumption with income. It is therefore reassuring that our results are broadly consistent.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the structure
we impose on the stochastic process for income. We also set out a simple model of
2Blundell and Preston use the UK Family Expenditure Survey whereas Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt use
US data. However, Dickens (2000) shows that the autocovariance structure in the UK data is very
similar to that documented by Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt although transitory shocks seem to be somewhat
more important in the UK. In this paper, we show that the US Consumer Expenditure Survey shows a
very similar pattern for consumption inequality as documented by Blundell and Preston for the UK.
4consumption and discuss how this model can be used to decompose income changes
into predictable life-cycle shocks and permanent and transitory income risk. Section 3
describes the dataset and discusses the evolution of income and consumption inequality
in the raw data. In section 4, we discuss how we use the information in these data
to estimate our model and describe the estimation procedure. Finally, in section 5 we
provide some evidence that the estimated model gives an accurate description of the
joint evolution of income and consumption inequality and present our results. Section
6 concludes.
2 Model
In this section we discuss the model that we employ to relate the evolution of income
and consumption inequality to income risk. Consider a stochastic process for log income
yit of an individual consumer i of age a at time t, where we omit the cohort index a for
simplicity. Income consists of a permanent and a transitory component and is subject
to three types of shocks,
yit = y
p





it￿1 + vit + ￿it (2)
where uit is a transitory shock and vit and ￿it are permanent shocks. The shocks uit
and vit are unpredictable to the consumer and thus represent income risk. We assume
these shocks have zero mean and are uncorrelated over time and with each other. The
shock ￿it looks unpredictable to the econometrician, but is predictable to the consumer.
Thus, ￿it will contribute to inequality but not to risk. Conditional on the information
set of the econometrician, we assume ￿it has zero mean, is serially uncorrelated as
well as uncorrelated with other shocks.3 The variances of the shocks are assumed to
be constant across individuals but may vary over time. These time-varying variances
represent transitory and permanent risk and the contribution of predictable shocks to
inequality.
The decomposition of income into a permanent component that follows a random
walk, and a transitory component that is serially uncorrelated, is both convenient and
fairly general, and has been widely used in the literature. Mo¢ tt and Gottschalk (1995)
test a more general process allowing the transitory component of income to follow an
ARMA process. They ￿nd that an ARMA(1,1) describes the data best, but the au-
tocorrelation in the transitory shocks is close to zero. Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron
(2004a) allow for the persistent component of income to have an autocorrelation co-
e¢ cient smaller than unity. Their point estimate for the autocorrelation lies between
0.98 and unity (for annual time series) and they cannot reject the hypothesis that the
persistent income shocks are permanent.
3The zero mean assumption is true by construction because we remove the average life-cycle pro￿le
from our data, see appendix A. For simplicity, we also assume that there are no aggregate shocks. In
earlier work we allow for aggregate shocks and ￿nd that these have a negligible e⁄ect on the trends in
inequality (Primiceri and Van Rens 2004).
5Substituting out y
p
it from expression (1) we get the following expression for the
innovations to income
yit = yit￿1 + vit + ￿it + ￿uit (3)
Income changes either because of shocks to permanent income, or because of changes in
the transitory component. The intuition for this is simply that the e⁄ect of a transitory
shock dies out in one period, so ceteris paribus a shock to transitory income at time t
raises income at time t and decreases it again at time t + 1. Notice that ￿it and vit are
clearly not separately identi￿ed using income data alone, which is why we need a model
of consumption behavior and data on consumption to identify these shocks.
In its simplest form, the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) predicts that consump-
tion follows a random walk, and that only shocks to permanent income (i.e. expected
life-time income) translate into changes in consumption. Following Blundell and Preston
(1998), we use this prediction to separate permanent from transitory shocks to income.
Consumption should not respond to transitory shocks since these shocks (almost) do
not a⁄ect the net present value of life-time income.
The behavior of consumption under the PIH can be summarized by the following
Euler equation for log consumption.4
cit = cit￿1 + vit (4)
Comparing equation (4) to equation (3) reveals the source of identi￿cation of life-cycle
heterogeneity from unpredictable permanent shocks. Permanent changes in income that
do not translate into changes in consumption are attributed to heterogeneity. If there are
other reasons why consumption does not respond one-for-one to changes in permanent
income, we will spuriously overestimate the contribution of heterogeneity to income
inequality. For example, in the simple model we use here, we cannot separately identify
predictable changes in income from unexpected, but insurable, income shocks. In section
5.3 we discuss this issue in more detail.
The evolution of income and consumption inequality follows by taking a cross-
sectional variance of equations (3) and (4).5
￿vart (y) = vart (v) + vart (￿) + ￿vart (u) (5)
￿vart (c) = vart (v) (6)
It is important to realize that the above expressions hold for individuals in the same
cohort of consumers that are born around the same time. This reconciles the prediction
put forward by Deaton and Paxson (1994) that shocks to permanent income unam-
biguously and irreversibly increase consumption inequality, as in equation (6), with the
observation that aggregate inequality does not always increase in the long run.
4As in Blundell and Preston (1998), this equation can be derived in a stylized model with in￿nitely-
lived consumers with time-separable CRRA preferences over consumption, who have unconstrained
access to a riskfree bond for borrowing and lending but otherwise face incomplete asset markets. To
obtain the martingale property of log consumption, one needs to log-linearize the Euler equation and
the life-time budget constraint.
5Notice that var(￿uit) = vart (u) + vart￿1 (u) and 2cov (￿uit;yit￿1) = ￿2cov (uit￿1;yit￿1) =
￿2vart￿1 (u).
63 Data
For our empirical analysis, we use data on US household income and consumption from
the CEX, the Consumer Expenditure Survey (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics 1999). This survey is conducted on an annual basis from 1980. Notice
that although the CEX data on income are not of the best quality, the CEX is the
only US dataset that has acceptable consumption as well as income data for the same
individuals.6
3.1 The microdata
In appendix A, we discuss the construction of the dataset and the way we control for
in￿ ation, seasonality, age e⁄ects, attrition bias and family composition. The ￿nal dataset
contains 42,325 urban households with complete income and consumption data and a
reference person (the person or one of the persons who owns or rents the home) who is
not retired, not a student nor living in student housing and between 20 and 65 years
old. This sample is representative for the full CEX sample of households aged between
20 and 65 (see the appendix for a more extensive discussion).
From the individual level data on consumption and income, we construct a synthetic
panel dataset of second moments for ￿ve 10-year cohorts. Households are assigned to
a cohort based on the age of the reference person in 1980. For example, cohort 45
consists of households with a reference person between 41 and 50 years old in 1980. In
1990, the average age of this cohort was 55 years. Table 1 shows the structure of the
dataset and reports cell sizes by cohort-year cells. To avoid sample sizes that are too
small to get a good estimate of the second moments, we eliminate cells with average age
below 25 or above 60 (these cells are shaded in the table). This implies that over time
the oldest cohorts exit and younger cohorts enter the sample and guarantees that the
average age of the sample is roughly constant over time, although the evolution of age
shows a ￿ clunky￿pattern, gradually increasing each year and sharply decreasing in years
when cohorts enter or exit the sample. The secondary dataset contains 75 cohort-year
cells with a median cell size of 602 households.7
Our measure of inequality within a cohort is the cross-sectional variance of con-
sumption or income. Other second moments we use in the estimation are the covariance
between consumption and income and the autocovariance of income. For all moments,
we use consumption and income in logs. In the remainder of this section, we discuss two
6The only alternative would be the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which has better income
data and a longer panel dimension, but only a rough proxy for consumption (expenditures on food).
7In some years, the sample sizes are substantially below the median cell size, see table 1. In 1986
and 1996, there are no expenditure data for interviews held in January because of changes in the
sample design. In addition, in 1986 the BLS changed the numbering of the household identi￿ers so that
households cannot be matched across the 1986 and 1985 ￿les, leading to a particularly large drop in the
number of observations in that year. Sample sizes in 1982 are lower partly because the survey sample
was smaller in the earlier years and partly because in in 1982 and 1983 the interview family ￿les do not
contain the summary expenditure variables that we use to construct our measure of consumption, so
that we need to aggregate these data from the detailed expenditure ￿les, which were not available for
all households.
7data problems that may a⁄ect these moments: measurement error and the timing of the
questions on income in the CEX. Section 3.2 presents some descriptive evidence from
the raw data on the evolution of income and consumption inequality over the sample
period.
Both income and consumption are measured with error. Our estimation results
however, are likely not to be a⁄ected by this problem. Assuming that the measurement
error is uncorrelated with the true levels of income and consumption, then it adds an
additive term to the variance of income and consumption. If we further assume that
the cross-sectional variance of the measurement error is constant over time, then this
additive bias term will drop out when we take ￿rst di⁄erences for a cohort over time,
so the evolution of inequality is una⁄ected, even if the level of inequality is biased.
Throughout the paper, we refrain from interpreting the levels of inequality and only use
changes in inequality for our estimation.8
A more serious data problem is the timing of the questions on income and consump-
tion in the CEX (Gervais and Klein 2005). Questions on consumption are asked in four
quarterly interviews and refer to the quarter preceding the interview. Therefore, the
four observations for consumption can be added up to obtain one observation for annual
consumption in the year preceding the last interview. Questions about income are asked
only in the ￿rst and last quarter and refer to income in the year preceding the inter-
view. Therefore, annual income from the last interview corresponds to the same period
as annual consumption and neither consumption nor income inequality are a⁄ected by
this timing problem. However, annual income from the ￿rst interview does not refer to
the preceding year, but overlaps income from the last interview by one quarter. This
biases the estimated covariance of income growth with past levels of income, one of the
moment conditions we use to estimate the model (see section 4.1). We deal with this
problem by assuming that income changes only at the beginning of the year, so that
observed income in the previous year ~ yit￿1 is a linear combination of the true income in
the previous year and income in this year, ~ yt￿1 = 3
4yt￿1 + 1
4yt, and correct the moment
condition accordingly.9
3.2 Income and consumption inequality
Figure 1 shows consumption and income inequality (the variance of log real consumption
and income) for the ￿ve cohorts over the sample period. The consumption graphs are
comparable to Deaton and Paxson (1994, ￿gure 2) although our sample period is twice
as long. We would expect to see two stylized facts in these data. First, as shown by
Deaton and Paxson (1994), inequality should rise within a cohort with age (so therefore
8Apart from the measurement error problem, the levels of inequality are also very sensitive to outliers.
Trimming the top and bottom 0:1% of the income distribution in each year, reduces the sample average
of the variance of log income from 0:74 to 0:68. Trimming the top and bottom 1% reduces inequality
further to as little as 0:55. Because the level of trimming is arbitrary, we do not trim outliers but rather
refrain from interpreting the levels of inequality.
9Under this assumption,
8
3cov (yt ￿ ~ yt￿1; ~ yt￿1) ￿
1
2￿var(yt) is a consistent estimator for
cov (￿yt;yt￿1). We also estimated the model under the ￿ naive￿ assumption that ~ yt￿1 = yt￿1 and
found that this makes very little di⁄erence in the results.
8over time) both for income and for consumption, with the increase being less pronounced
for consumption because of smoothing. Second, there should be an increase in inequality
common to all cohorts in the 1980s, which then ￿ attens out in the 1990s. Both ￿ facts￿
are not easy to see, partly because noise clouds the picture, and partly because both
age and time e⁄ects are interacting in the same graphs.
In ￿gure 2 we plot the coe¢ cient estimates of a regression of income and consumption
inequality on age dummies, as in Deaton and Paxson (1994, ￿gure 4). The solid line
shows the evolution of inequality with age controlling for cohort e⁄ects, the dashed line
controlling for time e⁄ects. We document a signi￿cant and approximately linear increase
in within-cohort consumption inequality with age, although the e⁄ect is substantially
smaller than in Deaton and Paxson. As pointed out by Slesnick and Ulker (2004) and
Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2005), the large increase in inequality over the
life-cycle that Deaton and Paxson ￿nd is partly due to the fact that their sample period
covers only the 1980s.
Figure 3 focuses on the time e⁄ects. The upper solid lines show the evolution of
inequality over time for the average cohort in our sample. This line is constructed by
regressing income and consumption inequality on year dummies and plotting the coef-
￿cient estimates. The lower solid line controls for a linear trend in inequality due to
the fact that the cohort ages over time (the straight dotted line plots this estimated
age e⁄ect). Controlling for the age e⁄ect, the evolution of average within cohort in-
equality should be similar to that of aggregate inequality, the cross-sectional variance
of log income or consumption for the whole sample at a given point in time. This is
indeed the case as can be seen from the graph by comparing the lower solid line to the
dashed line, which plots aggregate inequality.10 In the remainder of this paper, we will
present average within-cohort inequality and interpret it as aggregate inequality plus an
approximately linear increase in inequality due to the age e⁄ect.
Income inequality rose sharply in the early 1980s and remained high during the
second half of the 1980s and all of the 1990s. Consistent with other studies, we also
￿nd a temporary peak in inequality in the mid 1980s, which seems to be speci￿c to the
CEX data (Attanasio, Battistin and Ichimura 2004). We argue that this peak is partly
driven by sampling error, which even with relatively large cell sizes may lead to large
swings in the variance since the variance is sensitive to outliers. The peak becomes less
pronounced if we trim the income distribution for outliers, see footnote 8, or if we use
a robust estimator for the variance, see the discussion of ￿gure 4 in section 5. Because
any procedure to deal with potential outliers is, to some extent, arbitrary, we use the
raw data series and deal with the sampling error in the estimation procedure, see section
4.3.
Consumption inequality did not increase much over the sample period. This is also
10The (small) di⁄erences come from changes in the average age of the sample over time. Because
inequality increases with age, changes in the average age of the population will a⁄ect aggregate inequality.
For example, the ￿ baby-boomers￿entered the labor market around 1973 when they were 23 years old.
Ceteris paribus we would expect consumption and income inequality to decrease around this time.
Inequality would also decrease around in 2045, when the baby-boomers retire, and would gradually
increase in between due to the aging of the labor force.
9consistent with what other studies have found (Krueger and Perri 2006).
4 Empirical approach
The raw data are very noisy due to the relatively small number of households in a cohort-
year cell. In this section we discuss our estimation procedure, which is designed to extract
slow moving trends from these noisy data. First, we present a set of moment conditions
that represent the information available in the data. Then, we discuss a likelihood based,
Bayesian procedure that treats the time-varying variances of the idiosyncratic shocks as
unobservable components. Because this procedure imposes smoothness on movements
in the time-varying variances, it performs well in distinguishing low frequency trends
from noise. Moreover, the Gibbs sampler used to evaluate the likelihood has more
robust convergence properties than the high dimensional minimization routine needed
to estimate the model by minimum distance methods.
4.1 Moment conditions
We use expressions (3) and (4) to calculate moments that we can measure from the data.
Following Blundell and Preston (1998), ￿rst of all we use changes in the variances of log
income and log consumption, which represent the evolution of income and consumption
inequality, in which we are primarily interested. These moment conditions are given in
equations (5) and (6).
But there is more information in the data than just those two moment conditions.
First of all, we also use the change in the covariance between log income and log con-
sumption. Calculating the evolution of the covariance from (3) and (4), we get
￿covt (y;c) = vart (v) = ￿vart (c) (7)
The evolution of the covariance of income and consumption contains the same infor-
mation as the evolution of the variance of consumption under the model. Using both
moment conditions should improve the e¢ ciency of our estimates. The overidentifying
restriction also allows us to test the model speci￿cation.
A fourth moment condition is found in the autocovariance of income. Using the
information in the time series properties of income is attractive, because it corresponds
to the methodology in Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt (1994) and Mo¢ tt and Gottschalk (1995,
2002). Because covt (y;yt￿1) = covt (￿y;yt￿1)+vart￿1 (y) and we are already using the
information contained in the variance of income, we use covt (￿y;yt￿1). From (3), we
get
covt (￿y;yt￿1) = ￿vart￿1 (u) (8)
Moment conditions (5), (6), (7) and (8) contain all information in the second moments
of the joint evolution of income and consumption that we can retrieve from the data.
104.2 Identi￿cation
Consider equations (5), (6), (7) and (8), which hold for every cohort and every time
period and therefore represent 4JT moment conditions, where J is the number of cohorts
and T the number of time periods. These moment conditions need to identify 3T + 1
parameters: vart (v) and vart (￿) for t = 1 to T and vart (u) for t = 0 to T. The
autocovariance of income (8) provides an estimate for vart (u) for t = 0 to T ￿ 1.
Similarly, the moment conditions for the variance of consumption (6) or the covariance
(7) pin down vart (v) for t = 1 to T. Finally, given vart (v) and ￿vart (u), the variance
of income (5) can be used to retrieve vart (￿) for t = 1 to T ￿ 1. The variance of the
transitory shocks and therefore also the variance of the heterogeneity in life-cycle pro￿les
in the last period, varT (u) and varT (￿), are identi￿ed from a smoothness assumption
on the time variation in the variances of shocks to income.11
Measurement error does not a⁄ect the moment conditions for ￿vart (y), ￿vart (c)
and ￿covt (y;c) as we argued in section 3.1. In the moment condition for covt (￿y;yt￿1),
the variance of classical measurement error in income enters as an additive constant.
This constant is not separately identi￿ed from the level of the variance of the transitory
shocks, vart (u). However, since the variance of transitory shocks enters only as a ￿rst
di⁄erence, its level is not important for the evolution of income inequality.
Finally, we note that the assumption that uit, vit and ￿it are uncorrelated with past
values of income and consumption in the cross-section is crucial for the identi￿cation
strategy because it allows us to use the change in the variances and covariance, rather
than the variances and covariance of the changes in income and consumption. This
assumption is not an implication of the permanent income hypothesis (which holds for
an individual consumer) but follows from assuming that lagged aggregate consumption
is in each individual consumer￿ s information set (Chamberlain 1984, Deaton and Paxson
1994). As shown by Blundell and Preston (1998), testing the overidentifying restriction
that the covariance between income and consumption contains the same information
as the variance of consumption can be interpreted as a test for this assumption as
well as for the speci￿cation of the income process more generally (p.615). A likelihood
ratio test of this restriction against an unrestricted version of the model, in which the
covariance between income and consumption is left completely unconstrained, gives a
￿2 (19) statistic of 21:1, so that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the restriction
is satis￿ed in the data (p-value 0:33). This conclusion is con￿rmed by a Hausman test
that our estimates are the same whether or not we use the moment condition for the
covariance (p-value 0:99).
4.3 Estimation
To estimate the model we take a Bayesian, likelihood based approach, treating the time
varying variances vart (v), vart (￿) and vart (u) as unobservable states. Since we need to
to specify a law of motion for the time-varying variances, we assume that these variances
11See section 4.3 for details. The weaker identi￿cation scheme a⁄ects only the estimates in the last
period of our sample. Moreover, a model with time-invariant heterogeneity, vart (￿) = var(￿) for all t,
which is identi￿ed without the smoothness assumption, gives virtually identical results, see section 5.4.
11follow independent random walk processes. Of course, variances cannot be negative and,
at ￿rst sight, the random walk assumption may seem inadequate. However, because the
time dimension of the sample is short, the random walk can be thought as a (good) ￿rst
order approximation of a more complicated and theoretically justi￿able process for the
two variances.12 The assumption has the advantage that it imposes smoothness on the
movements in the variances. Since we want to capture low frequency time variation, the
smoothness helps to identify signal from noise.
A Bayesian approach is natural in estimating unobservable components. Even more
so in a panel context, where the distinction between parameters and shocks is less clear
than in other situations. Moreover, because we use ￿ at and uninformative priors, the
Bayesian procedure has a likelihood interpretation. With ￿ at priors, the posterior modes
of the parameters correspond exactly to the maximum likelihood estimates. Finally,
and particularly important in this case, the Bayesian approach allows to split up the
high dimensional problem into a series of simpler and lower dimensional ones. This
has the advantage that the numerical procedure is more robust and that it is easier to
calculate standard errors that are correct for ￿nite sample inference instead of relying
on asymptotic theory. Appendix B describes the Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm
for the numerical evaluation of the posterior of the parameters of interest.
5 Results
Figure 4 plots the actual data (thin solid line) and the ￿tted values of our model (thick
solid line) for the evolution of inequality over the sample period. The upper panel
displays income inequality, the lower panel consumption inequality. The model captures
the overall trend in both income and consumption inequality very well, as well as some
of the high frequency ￿ uctuations in the data. The random walk assumption on the law
of motions for the time varying variances imposes some smoothness on these estimates.
As a consequence, the large peak in income inequality from 1984 to 1988 for instance
(which is not present in other datasets), is not captured.
We argue that the deviation of the actual data from the ￿tted values is largely at-
tributable to measurement and sampling error. To support this argument, the third line
in the graphs (dash-dotted) presents the raw data again, now using a robust estimator
for inequality.13 As is clear from the graph, the model predicted values are very close
to the robust series. We did not use these series in the estimation procedure so that
the ￿t is quite remarkable. We conclude that the estimation procedure manages well
to distinguish noise from signal and the ￿tted values provide a good description of the
joint evolution of income and consumption inequality.
12The estimation algorithm allows to restrict the variances to be positive at all points in time. However,
because the point estimates turn out to be positive, the normality assumption does not a⁄ect the results.
We also reestimated our model assuming the variances follow autoregressive processes and found very
similar results.
13Assuming the logs of income and consumption are normally distributed in the cross-section, the
robust estimator for the standard deviation equals the median absolute deviation from the median
divided by 0.6745 (Huber 1981).
125.1 Sources of inequality
In order to assess the contribution of the di⁄erent shocks to changes in inequality, we ask
the question how income inequality would have evolved without each shock. Figures 5,
6 and 7 present the counterfactual evolution of income inequality if predictable changes
￿it, unpredictable permanent shocks vit or transitory shocks uit would have been zero
for all individuals in every period. The upper panels of these graphs show the predicted
values for income inequality for the counterfactual exercise (thin solid lines) as well as
for the full model (thick solid lines). The lower panels plot the di⁄erence between the
two lines, which represents the contribution of each type of shock, with one standard
error bands. In order to be able to compare those graphs to the evolution of aggregate
inequality, we have also plotted a straight line representing the average increase of within
cohort income inequality with age, which we refer to as the age e⁄ect.
It is clear from ￿gure 5 that predictable permanent shocks explain the vast majority
of changes in income inequality. Without these predictable shocks, income inequality
would actually have gone down over the sample period. This result is consistent with
Guvenen (2005), who ￿nds that heterogeneous life-cycle changes make up 65 to 80% of
the life-time increase in income inequality within a cohort. We show that, in addition,
changes in the amount of this heterogeneity can account for the increase in aggregate
income inequality over the period 1980-2000.
The variance of unpredictable permanent shocks went up as well, see ￿gure 6, so
that part of the increase in inequality in the early 1980s can be attributed to increased
permanent income risk. However, this contribution is a factor 3 smaller than the increase
in inequality due to predictable shocks. Moreover, from the second half of the 1980s
onwards, permanent risk seems to have gone down again and, at the end of the sample,
the increase is smaller than the age e⁄ect, so that aggregate inequality would have gone
down if permanent risk were the only source of inequality over this period.
As shown in ￿gure 7, transitory inequality also increased in the early 1980s. But
this increase is very small, much smaller than the increase in transitory inequality found
by Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt (1994, 2002) and more in line with the results of Blundell,
Pistaferri and Preston (2008). On the other hand, the evolution of transitory inequality
is consistent with Mo¢ tt and Gottschalk (2002). Like them, we ￿nd a reversal of the
increase in transitory inequality, with inequality due to transitory shocks decreasing in
the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. If transitory shocks were the only source of
inequality, by 2000 income inequality would have decreased substantially compared to
1980.
So was the increase in income inequality in the 1980s due to permanent or transitory
shocks? Our estimates clearly point towards the importance of permanent sources of
inequality. However, since we estimate most of the permanent shocks to be predictable
to consumers, we do not ￿nd evidence for an increase in permanent income risk (the
variance of unexpected permanent shocks) over this period. Based on our estimates,
the evolution of risk shows a markedly di⁄erent picture than the evolution of inequality.
Whereas inequality increased in the 1980s and remained high, the increase in risk seems
to have been temporary. By 2000, permanent income risk was as high as it was in 1980
13and transitory risk had substantially decreased.
5.2 The joint evolution of income and consumption inequality
We have shown that our model manages to capture the joint evolution of consumption
and income inequality well and that a large part of the evolution of income inequality
is explained by changes in income that look unpredictable to the econometrician but
are predictable for consumers. The reason is simple. The time series properties of
income (its autocovariance) suggest that most income changes are permanent. However,
the evolution of consumption inequality shows that consumption nevertheless did not
respond much to these changes in income. Therefore, in the context of our simple model
of consumption behavior, the vast majority of permanent shocks are estimated to be
predictable.
As pointed out in the introduction, this simple insight reconciles two seemingly
contradictory branches of literature (Carroll 1992, Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt 1994, Mo¢ tt
and Gottschalk 1995, 2002 and Blundell and Preston 1998). In order to understand
what drives this result, we re-estimated our model several times, imposing di⁄erent
sets of restrictions in order to reproduce either Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt￿ s or Blundell and
Preston￿ s results. In ￿gure 8 we plot ￿tted values for income and consumption inequality
for these alternative models and ￿gure 9 presents the contribution of permanent shocks
for each. The thin and thick solid lines in ￿gure 8 are the same as in ￿gure 4 and represent
the evolution of inequality in the data and in the baseline model respectively. In ￿gure
9, the thick solid line presents our estimate for the total contribution of predictable and
unpredictable permanent shocks on income inequality.
First, consider the dashed line in ￿gure 8, which represents the estimates of a model
in the spirit of Mo¢ tt and Gottschalk (1995). To obtain these estimates, we simpli￿ed
the income process by no longer distinguishing between predictable and unpredictable
permanent shocks. Then, we estimated this model on a subset of the moment conditions
we use in the baseline, removing all information about consumption inequality and
using only the moment conditions for income inequality (5) and the autocovariance of
income (8). To obtain ￿tted values for consumption inequality, we assume all permanent
shocks are unexpected to consumers, the assumption that Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt make
implicitly when interpreting their results. Unsurprisingly, this model ￿ts the evolution
of income inequality well but completely fails to explain the evolution of consumption
inequality. The reason is that the autocovariance of income suggests that the increase
in income inequality is due to permanent shocks (￿gure 9). Therefore, consumption
inequality should have increased substantially over the whole sample period, with the
strongest increase in the early 1980s.
Next, consider the dash-dot line, which replicates the estimates in Blundell and
Preston (1998). To estimate this model, we again use the simpli￿ed income process and
consumption model, but now we estimate it using the consumption moment conditions
(6) and (7) in addition to the moment condition for income inequality (5), but not
condition (8) for the autocovariance of income. By assumption, this model captures
the evolution of both income and consumption inequality well. Blundell and Preston
14consider all permanent shocks to be unpredictable and identify these shocks as shocks to
which consumption inequality responds. Consequently, because consumption inequality
did not increase much over the sample period, they ￿nd a very small contribution of
permanent shocks to income inequality (see ￿gure 9).
Then we re-estimate the simpli￿ed model without predictable shocks, but now using
all moment conditions. These estimates are presented as the dotted line in ￿gures 8 and
9. Now, there is a con￿ ict between the information in the consumption data, represented
in moment conditions (6) and (7), and the information in moment condition (8) about
the time series properties of income. As a result, the estimate for the contribution of
permanent shocks as well as the ￿tted values for consumption inequality are very close
to those of Blundell and Preston, but the model can no longer match the evolution
of income inequality as the estimation procedure tries to ￿nd a ￿ compromise￿between
con￿ icting sets of moment conditions.
Finally, in the full model we allow for predictable permanent shocks. These shocks
are permanent insofar as the autocovariance of income is concerned, but they are also
￿ transitory￿in the de￿nition of Blundell and Preston, in the sense that consumption
inequality does not increase because of these shocks. With this extension, we match the
joint evolution of income and consumption inequality as well as Blundell and Preston
do, but we ￿nd a contribution of permanent shocks (predictable plus unpredictable) to
income inequality that is close to Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt￿ s estimates.
5.3 Risk sharing
What alternative explanations are consistent with the evolution of income as well as
consumption inequality? Several authors have proposed that consumers may be able
to partially insure their consumption against permanent income shocks (Storesletten,
Telmer and Yaron 2004b, Primiceri and Van Rens 2004, Blundell, Pistaferri and Pre-
ston 2008). In the context of the model in this paper, the heterogeneity and partial
insurance interpretations are observationally equivalent. Our consumption model is an
incomplete markets model and insurance markets are non-existing. By investing in a
risk-free bond, consumers can save and borrow freely, but they cannot pool risks with
other consumers so that they cannot insure their consumption path against unexpected
permanent shocks. If in reality insurance markets do exist, it is possible that our esti-
mate for the variance of ￿it includes not only predictable shocks but also unpredictable
but insurable permanent shocks. Although this distinction is not the main focus of this
paper, in this section we argue that heterogeneity provides an explanation for the data
that is at least as plausible as partial risk sharing, which has received far more attention
in the literature.
Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004b) evaluate how consumption and income in-
equality change with age (over the life cycle). They ￿nd that consumption inequality
predicted by their model is about 20% higher than in the data and explain this discrep-
ancy by implicit risk sharing through the social security system. Blundell, Pistaferri
and Preston (2008) evaluate the evolution of inequality over time in a framework simi-
lar to the one in this paper. They use food consumption and household characteristics
15to impute total nondurable consumption in the PSID data and estimate the fraction of
permanent income shocks that are not insured. They ￿nd consumption growth responds
by a factor 0:64 to permanent shocks, which implies that the fraction of the variance
of permanent income shocks that are insured based on their estimates is 0:6, roughly
similar to our estimates.
How can we distinguish the risk sharing explanation from the heterogeneous income
pro￿les explanation? If consumption does not respond to income shocks because of risk
sharing, we would expect part of that risk sharing to happen through the government,
through taxes and transfers, and part through markets for ￿nancial assets. We test
this prediction of the risk sharing hypothesis by re-estimating the model for di⁄erent
measures of income. In each case, we report the results as the fraction of permanent
shocks that are predictable or insured in three broad time periods: the early 1980s, all
of the 1980s and the whole sample period (1980s and 1990s).
These estimates are reported in table 2. In the baseline estimates, income is de￿ned
as disposable income after taxes and transfers. Rows 2, 3 and 4 of the table present
estimates when income is measured as gross income before taxes (but including ￿nancial
income and transfers); gross income before taxes excluding income from ￿nancial mar-
kets; and earned income (before taxes and transfers and excluding all sources of income
other than wage and salary payments). The estimates in rows 2 and 3 are indistinguish-
able from the baseline. Neither the tax system nor ￿nancial markets seem to contribute
to risk sharing. Transfers seem to provide some insurance, with the fraction of shocks
to which consumption is insured going up as we would expect. However, the di⁄erence
in the estimates is very small and not signi￿cant.
Thus, the evidence is not inconsistent with the risk sharing hypothesis. However,
we ￿nd weak quantitative support for its basic predictions. This suggests that it is
unlikely that risk sharing constitutes the whole story and thus that heterogeneity plays
an important role. Moreover, as we argued in the introduction, the interpretation that
most inequality is driven by heterogeneity is consistent with a number of recent papers
decomposing inequality in heterogeneity and uncertainty using schooling choices (Cunha,
Heckman and Navarro 2005, Cunha and Heckman 2006, Huggett, Ventura and Yaron
2006).
5.4 Robustness
In this section, we explore the robustness of our results to a number of modi￿cations
to the dataset and model. The estimates are summarized in table 3. First, we evaluate
to what extent the results are sensitive to the choices we made in constructing our
secondary dataset of variances and covariances from the microdata (see appendix A for
details). For the estimates in row 2, we do not exclude households for which income
is topcoded from the dataset; in row 3, we try a di⁄erent equivalence scale to convert
household consumption into per capita consumption equivalents;14 and in rows 4 and 5
14We divide income by the number of people in the household and consumption by the number of
adults plus 0.4 times the number of children as in Parker and Preston (2005), instead of regressing
consumption and income on the number of adults and the number of children and taking residuals.
16we try di⁄erent de￿ ators to convert nominal consumption into real terms.15 In all cases,
the results are very close to and insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from the baseline.
Second, we explore how the results are a⁄ected by our choice about what kind of
expenditures to include in nondurable consumption. Rows 6 and 7 present estimates if
we use only expenditures on food and beverages or all expenditures (including durables)
respectively. It is quite remarkable that the results are virtually unaltered even for these
large deviations from the baseline.
Next, in order to determine whether sampling error might be a⁄ecting the results,
we use a dataset in which we use a robust estimator for the variances of consumption
and income. Even though the data are quite noisy and the raw data series for the robust
estimators are rather di⁄erent (see ￿gure 4), the estimation method performs well at
extracting signal from noise and the estimates in row 8 are very close to the baseline.
Finally, we explore sensitivity to modi￿cations of the model. Our baseline model does
not capture excess sensitivity to (transitory) changes in income. As a rough control for
excess sensitivity, we assume that a fraction ￿ of consumers is ￿ hand-to-mouth￿and
consumes all of current income. This parameter ￿ can be interpreted as the fraction of
consumers that are credit constrained or as a proxy for precautionary savings.16 The
modi￿ed model equations and moment conditions are given in appendix C and row 9
presents the estimates for this model. Because our estimate for ￿ is very low (3:1% with
a standard error of 2:3%), allowing for credit constraints does not change the results
much.17 In row 10 we present estimates if we assume a non-zero interest rate, so that
the marginal propensity to consume out of transitory shocks is small but not zero and
in row 11, we restrict the variance of predictable life-cycle shocks to be constant over
time. Again, these changes a⁄ect the results very little.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we used repeated cross-section data on income and consumption from the
CEX to evaluate the nature of the increase in income inequality in the US over the last
two decades. The stochastic process for income that we assume includes predictable
life-cycle changes and unexpected permanent and transitory shocks. We estimate the
contribution of each of these three shocks to total inequality. The model ￿ts the joint
15In the baseline, we use the CPI for nondurables for consumption and the CPI for total expenditures
for income. In row 4, we use item speci￿c CPI indices for the di⁄erent categories of expenditures that
constitute nondurable consumption. In row 5, we use the CPI for total expenditures for consumption
as well as for income.
16Precautionary saving is closely related to liquidity constraints, both theoretically and empirically
(Carroll 2001). Gourinchas and Parker (2001) non-parametrically estimate the consumption policy rule
and ￿nd that consumption does not respond to cash-on-hand, for consumers with liquid wealth above a
certain level ~ A which would be in line with the permanent income hypothesis. If wealth is below ~ A, the
marginal propensity to consume out of extra cash-on-hand is close to one.
17The low estimate for ￿ might be surprising, particularly in light of the fact that previous estimates
from aggregate data (Campbell and Mankiw 1990) point towards a much larger fraction of hand-to-
mouth consumers (about 50%). Our estimate is consistent, however, with Attanasio and Weber (1995),
who show that the Campbell-Mankiw result is driven by aggregation problems and by the e⁄ect of
demographics and labor supply variables on the marginal utility of consumption.
17evolution of income and consumption inequality well. Almost all of the increase in
income inequality was due to predictable life-cycle shocks. The variances of both per-
manent and transitory unexpected shocks also increased in the early 1980s, but these
increases were small and got reversed in the 1990s.
Our set of moment conditions summarizes all information available from the CEX
data. In particular, we use information both on the autocovariance structure of income
and on the comovement of income and consumption. By allowing for predictable changes
in permanent income (heterogeneity), we reconcile the seemingly contradictory ￿ndings
that the increase in income inequality was due mainly to permanent shocks (Mo¢ tt
and Gottschalk 2002), yet consumption inequality did not increase much over the same
period (Blundell and Preston 1998, Krueger and Perri 2006).
A Data description
The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) is a rolling panel. Each month a new group
of about 500 new households enters the survey (annual sample size is about 5,870 house-
holds in the later years). A household or ￿ consumer unit￿is a group of individuals living
together as a family. These households are interviewed each quarter, for ￿ve quarters in
a row. The ￿rst meeting is an introductory interview where respondents are asked about
family characteristics and are given information about how to gather their expenditure
information. In the second through ￿fth interview households report expenditures over
the previous quarter. Expenditures are coded by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, as-
signed a Universal Classi￿cation Category (UCC) number, and aggregated into several
broader categories. The BLS gathers these data primarily in order to calculate the Con-
sumer Price Index. Questions about income are asked in the second and ￿fth interview
only, and refer to the preceding 12 months, see section 3.1 in the main text.
As our measure of consumption we use non-durable consumption, consisting of ex-
penditures on food and beverages, utilities, gas and motor oil, public transportation,
reading materials, tobacco products, personal care and apparel. For income we use
family income after tax. Nominal income and consumption are converted to real values
using the CPI-U indices (all urban consumers) for total expenditure and nondurable
expenditures respectively.
We limit our sample to households with a reference person (the person or one of
the persons who owns or rents the home) between 20 and 65 years old; that live in
urban areas (data on non-urban households is not available in 1982 and 1983); report
non-zero expenditures on food; for which complete data on income are available and
not topcoded (drops 18% of the sample between 20 and 65 years old) and that are not
retired (4%), student (1.1%) or living in student housing (0.5%). Because households
need to be matched across quarterly surveys in order to obtain a measure of annual
consumption, we run a series of checks to identify mismatches.18 The resulting sample
18In particular, we suspect a ￿ mismatch￿if the household changes cohort or because any of the 6
categories of family composition (male and female members under 2 years old, between 2 and 15 years
old and over 15) changes by more than 2 people. Clearly not all of those are actually mismatches. In
18contains information of about 2100 households per year.
Comparing our sample with the full sample of urban households with reference person
between 20 and 65 years of age, the households in our sample are slightly younger (40.14
instead of 41.27 years old) because we dropped households with a retired reference
person, and have somewhat higher income ($31804 versus $27908 per year) because
we removed incomplete income reporters. The two samples are very similar in terms of
family size, the fraction of married and single reference persons, the number of adults and
children, the number of earners and average hours worked by the reference person and her
or his partner. The samples are also very similar in terms of three di⁄erent measures of
consumption: expenditures on food and beverages, non-durable consumption as de￿ned
above and total expenditures.
We make a number of adjustments to the raw data in order to make them comparable
to their corresponding theoretical concepts. First, we purge individual income from its
predictable dynamics because of seasonality, attrition bias and life-cycle changes. To
do this, we regress log real income on a set of month dummies, interview dummies and
a fourth order polynomial in age and take the residuals. A fourth order polynomial
captures the shape of the average age pro￿le in income well.19 In order not to introduce
spurious (lack of) correlation, we apply the same procedure to consumption.20
Second, we control for family composition to translate consumption and income per
household into per capita terms. If there are returns to scale from living together with
other consumers in a household, then family composition may directly a⁄ect the mar-
ginal utility of consumption. Typically, the literature uses an approximate equivalence
scale to address this problem. We follow this practice and regress consumption on the
number of adults and the number of children in the household. The estimates indicate
that consumption is higher by about 27% for each extra adult, and by 4% for each
additional kid.21 These coe¢ cients are similar for income, although the coe¢ cient on
the number of children has the opposite sign.22
We do not control for other potential preference shifters like education or hours
worked (to allow for non-seperabilities between consumption and leisure). These vari-
ables are highly correlated with income so that we risk removing exactly the variation we
particular, a household can change cohort if the title for the house moves from mother to daughter for
instance. However, these changes invalidate the link between an observed and a theoretical household.
19These ￿ age e⁄ects￿in the levels of income should not be confused with the age e⁄ects in the variance,
which we take into account explicitly in our estimation procedure.
20In part, the hump-shaped age pro￿le in consumption re￿ ects the predictions of the model, e.g.
precautionary savings. However, demographics and other -potentially unobservable- preferce shifters
also a⁄ect the age pro￿le. Because it is impossible to disentangle the two e⁄ects, we purge the age
pro￿le from consumption as well as income, preferring to remove valid variation from the data rather
than not to remove variation that has no bearing on the model.
21We also tried more ￿ exible speci￿cations, allowing for extra persons to have di⁄erent e⁄ects on
household consumption depending on their age and gender, but these di⁄erences were insigni￿cant.
22There is an issue whether we want to use separately estimated coe¢ cients for income, or use the
coe¢ cients from the consumption regression. Using the estimates from the consumption regression leaves
the savings rate unaltered (because income and consumption are adjusted by the same percentage) but
may not remove spurious changes in income due to family composition, see Gourinchas and Parker
(2002) for a discussion.
19are interested in. Conditioning on education has the additional problem that it would
remove all changes in inequality because of changes in the skill premium, an important
source of earnings inequality.
B Estimation method
This appendix describes the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm for the
numerical evaluation of the posterior. The parameters of interest are the unobservable
states, vart(v), vart (￿) and vart(u) and the so called hyperparameters, which are di-
vided in three blocks: ￿ contains the variances of the innovations to the unobservable
states and the variances of the error terms in the moment conditions, [A;V ]
0 is the vec-
tor of age e⁄ects and ￿ represents the excess sensitivity parameter. All the shocks are
assumed to be jointly normal, with a block diagonal covariance matrix.
The estimation algorithm is based on Gibbs sampling. Gibbs sampling is a particular
variant of MCMC methods and consists of stepwise drawing from lower dimensional
conditional posteriors instead of from the high dimensional joint posterior of the whole
set of parameters. In this application, Gibbs sampling is carried out in four steps:
1. Drawing the age e⁄ects.
Conditional on the data and the rest of the parameters, A and V appear as re-
gression coe¢ cients in a system of linear equations. Therefore, their posterior
distribution is Gaussian, with mean and variances given by the SUR estimate and
the variance of the SUR estimator.
2. Drawing the variances of the innovations to the unobservable states and the vari-
ances of the error terms in the moment conditions.
Conditional on the data and the rest of the parameters, the residuals of the model
are observed. Therefore, the posterior of each element of ￿ is inverse-gamma with
T degrees of freedom and scale parameters given by the sum of squared residu-
als (details can be found in Gelman et al. 1994). We use a loose, but non-￿ at
prior for the variances of the innovations to the unobservable states. The prior we
use is an inverse-gamma with 2 degrees of freedom and scale parameters equal to
0:0005 for the permanent shocks and 0:005 for the transitory shocks. The reason
we use a non-￿ at prior here is to avoid the so called pile-up problem, which is
common in time-varying parameter models (see, for instance, Stock and Watson
1998). Notice that the prior favors time variation in the variance of the transitory
shocks. Therefore, if anything, it strengthens our result that transitory shocks did
not matter for the increase in inequality of the 1980s.
3. Drawing the unobservable states.
Conditional on the data and the rest of the parameters, equations (??), (??),
(7), (8) form a system of observation equations. Together with the random walk
assumption for the evolution of the time-varying variances, this is a linear and
Gaussian state space model. We use a standard simulation smoother (see, for
20instance, Carter and Kohn 1994) to make draws from the posterior of the unob-
servable states (the time-varying variances).
4. Drawing the excess sensitivity parameter (this step is not implemented for the
model without ￿).
Conditional on the data and the rest of the parameters, ￿ appears as a regression
coe¢ cient in a system of linear equations. Therefore, its posterior distribution is
Gaussian, with mean and variances given by the SUR estimate and the variance
of the SUR estimator.
Our estimates are based on 30,000 iterations of the Gibbs sampler, discarding the
￿rst 5,000 to allow the system to convergence to its ergodic distribution. The sample
autocorrelation functions of the draws decay fast and the convergence checks are fully
satisfactory.
C Credit constraints and precautionary saving
With a fraction ￿ of consumers behaving hand-to-mouth, either because they are credit
constrained or because of precautionary savings, the response of consumption to income
shocks is given by,
￿cit =
(
￿yit for a fraction ￿ of the individuals
￿c￿
it for the remaining fraction 1 ￿ ￿
(9)
where ￿c￿
it is the change in consumption for consumers that behave as if they follow the
permanent income model as in (4).
The variance of changes in consumption within a cohort over time, is given by a
weighted average of the within group variances for credit constrained and PIH con-
sumers.23
vart (￿c) = (1 ￿ ￿)vart (￿c￿) + ￿vart (￿y) (10)
The change in the variance of the level of consumption depends not only on the vari-
ance of the changes in consumption, but also on their covariance with past levels of
consumption.
￿vart (c) = vart (￿c) + 2cov (￿cit;cit￿1) (11)
We need to take a stance on whether consumption last period was set according to the
PIH or credit constraints were binding in the last period. Let p be the probability that if
23This is a special case of the decomposition of an unconditional variance into the expectation of
a conditional variance plus the variance of the conditional expectation. The derivation relies on an
assumption that the probability that a consumer is credit constrained is uncorrelated with recent
shocks to her income. If this assumption is violated, vart (￿c) includes a between-group variance
term ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(E [￿c
￿
tjX = 0] ￿ E [￿ytjX = 1])
2, where X is a binary variable indicating whether the
consumer is constrained, i.e. P [X = 1] = ￿. Under the assumption that X is uncorrelated with vit, ￿it,
uit and uit￿1, the cross-sectional conditional means of ￿c
￿ and ￿y equal zero.
21the consumer is constrained this period, she was also constrained in the previous period.
Then, the evolution of consumption inequality is given by
￿vart (c) = vart (v) + ￿vart (￿) + ￿vart (u) + ￿(1 ￿ 2p)vart￿1 (u) (12)
Assuming p = 1, expression (12) simpli￿es to
￿vart (c) = vart (v) + ￿vart (￿) + ￿￿vart (u) (13)
Compared to the evolution of consumption inequality under the PIH in equation (6),
expression (13) tells us that consumption inequality may increase because of an in-
crease in transitory income inequality, because a fraction ￿ of consumers displays excess
sensitivity to income changes.
In terms of the remaining moment conditions, like in the baseline model in section
4.1, the covariance of income and consumption contains the same information as the
variance of consumption. The moment condition for the autocovariance of income (8)
is una⁄ected by credit constraints.
Identi￿cation in model with credit constrained consumers is weaker than in the
simpler model in the main text. Conditional on ￿, identi￿cation of the time-varying
variances of the shocks is the same, see section 4.2. The parameter ￿ is identi￿ed from
the correlation between ￿vart (c) and ￿vart (u), see equation (13), where ￿vart (u)
is identi￿ed from the autocovariance structure of income (8). The additional assump-
tion required to estimate ￿ from equation (13) is orthogonality between ￿vart (u) and
vart (v)+￿vart (￿), which follows from our assumption that the variances of the shocks
follow independent laws of motion, see section 4.3. If the various sources of risk are in
fact positively correlated over time, then our estimate for ￿ is an upper bound for the
true fraction of hand-to-mouth consumers in the economy. Since our estimate for ￿ is
very low, we are con￿dent that our results are not driven by this assumption.
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25Table 1
Cell sizes by cohort and year
Year 5 15 25 35 45 55 65 75 85
1980 21 205 179 136 126 82 23 5
1981 93 953 913 622 610 290 84 24
1982 56 260 200 143 134 61 19 4
1983 151 778 658 439 482 163 44 11
1984 201 812 731 453 440 153 43 11
1985 359 1168 1028 693 568 185 52 4
1986 1 116 241 162 118 85 37 12 3
1987 0 441 933 781 588 390 124 37 4
1988 1 422 777 637 416 298 87 22 5
1989 8 505 759 653 443 254 86 21 2
1990 32 550 811 678 421 244 61 20 2
1991 48 604 766 640 360 219 62 22
1992 83 633 831 574 388 171 50 16
1993 106 660 819 581 364 164 44 13
1994 151 692 811 602 341 124 32 7
1995 221 773 938 736 386 122 35 4
1996 137 355 368 253 133 31 9 4
1997 289 643 708 483 192 60 16 2
1998 352 685 691 508 215 70 19 2
1999 453 693 726 499 200 69 16 3
2000 342 565 566 384 144 52 10
Cohorts (average age of reference person in 1980)
26Table 2
Contribution of predictable permanent shocks for di⁄erent measures of income
1980-1985 1980-1990 1980-2000
1) Baseline 0.76 0.80 0.83
(0.17) (0.15) (0.12)
2) Income before taxes 0.76 0.80 0.83
(0.18) (0.16) (0.12)
3) Income (before tax), excl financial income 0.76 0.80 0.84
(0.18) (0.16) (0.12)
4) Earned income (before tax and transfers) 0.81 0.84 0.89
(0.21) (0.16) (0.11)




1) Baseline 0.76 0.80 0.83
(0.17) (0.15) (0.12)
2) Including topcoded incomes 0.74 0.79 0.83
(0.17) (0.15) (0.12)
3) Different equivalence scale 0.75 0.79 0.79
(0.20) (0.20) (0.17)
4) CPI: Item specific 0.74 0.78 0.81
(0.17) (0.15) (0.12)
5) CPI: Total expenditures 0.76 0.80 0.83
(0.17) (0.15) (0.11)
6) Consumption: Food only 0.66 0.73 0.79
(0.23) (0.21) (0.15)
7) Consumption: Total expenditures 0.62 0.65 0.74
(0.22) (0.21) (0.16)
8) Sampling error: Robust estimators 0.70 0.71 0.76
(0.19) (0.17) (0.14)
9) Credit constraints: λ = 0.031 (0.023) 0.80 0.83 0.85
(0.17) (0.14) (0.11)
10) Interest rate: r = 5% 0.76 0.80 0.83
(0.16) (0.15) (0.11)
11) No time variation predictable shocks 0.67 0.80 0.82
(0.20) (0.22) (0.22)
Share of permanent inequality that is predictable
28Figure 1
Income and consumption inequality by cohort
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1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
The blue dashed line is income inequality (the variance of log income), plotted on the
left scale. The red solid line is consumption inequality, plotted on the right axis. The
￿ve di⁄erent graphs represent ￿ve di⁄erent cohorts, identi￿ed by their age in 1980. For
the sample sizes used to calculate inequality in each cohort, see table 1.
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The blue solid line plots the coe¢ cient estimates of a regression of income and consump-
tion inequality on age dummies, controlling for cohort e⁄ects (￿ve cohort dummies). For
the raw data by cohort, see ￿gure 1. The red dotted lines represent the two standard
error bands for these estimates. The green dashed line controls for time e⁄ects (seven
time dummies for 3 year periods: 1980-1982, 1983-1985, etc.), rather than cohort e⁄ects.
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The blue solid lines show the evolution of inequality over time for the average cohort in
our sample. These lines are constructed by regressing income and consumption inequal-
ity on year dummies and plotting the coe¢ cient estimates. The lower line controls for
a linear trend in age and the straight green dotted line plots the estimated age e⁄ect.
The red dashed line is aggregate inequality, the cross-sectional variance of log income
or consumption for the whole sample in each year.
31Figure 4
Income and consumption inequality: data and model predicted values


















(b): Actual (robust and non robust) and model predicted consumption inequality
32Figure 5
Contribution of predictable permanent shocks to income inequality






(a): Income inequality without permanent predicable inequality
Model
Counterfactual












Contribution of unpredictable permanent shocks to income inequality






(a): Income inequality without permanent unpredicable inequality
Model
Counterfactual











Contribution of transitory shocks to income inequality






(a): Income inequality without transitory inequality
Model
Counterfactual













Model predicted evolution of inequality for di⁄erent models






(a): Income inequality: actual and predicted by different models











Contribution of permanent shocks to inequality for di⁄erent models









Permanent inequality predicted by different models
Baseline
No predictable inequality
Blundell and Preston
Gottschalk and Moffitt
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